Bava Kamma 39

ההוא ברחא דחזא ליפתא אפומא דדנא סריך סליק אכלה לליפתא ותבריה לדנא חייביה רבא אליפתא ואדנא נזק שלם מאי טעמא כיון דאורחיה למיכל ליפתא אורחיה נמי לסרוכי ולמסלק

There was a case where a goat, noticing turnips upon the top of a cask, climbed up there and consumed the turnips and broke the jar. — Raba thereupon ordered full payment both for the turnips and for the jar; the reason being that since it was usual with it to consume turnips it was also usual to climb up [for them].

אמר אילפא בהמה ברשות הרבים ופשטה צוארה ואכלה מעל גבי חברתה חייבת מאי טעמא גבי חברתה כחצר הניזק דמי

Ilfa stated: In the case of an animal on public ground stretching out its neck and consuming food that had been placed upon the back of another animal, there would be liability to pay; the reason being that the back of the other animal would be counted as the plaintiff's premises. May we say that the following teaching supports his view: 'In the case of a plaintiff who had a bundle [of grain] hanging over his back and [somebody else's animal] stretched out its neck and consumed [the grain] out of it, there would be liability to pay'? — No, just as Raba elsewhere referred to a case where the animal was jumping [an act which being quite unusual would be subject to the law of Horn<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which could not be exempted from liability even on public ground. ');">¹</span>

לימא מסייע ליה היתה קופתו מופשלת לאחוריו ופשטה צוארה ואכלה ממנו חייבת כדאמר רבא בקופצת הכא נמי בקופצת

], so also this teaching might perhaps similarly deal with a case of jumping.

והיכא איתמר דרבא אהא דאמר רבי אושעיא בהמה ברשות הרבים הלכה ואכלה פטורה עמדה ואכלה חייבת מאי שנא הלכה דאורחיה הוא עמדה נמי אורחיה הוא אמר רבא בקופצת

With reference to what was Raba's statement made? — [It was made] with reference to the following statement of R. Oshaia: In the case of an animal on public ground going along and consuming, there would be exemption, but if it was standing and consuming there would be liability to pay. Why this difference? If in the case of walking [there is exemption, since] it is usual with animal to do so, is it not also in the case of standing usual with it to do so? — [It was on this question that] Raba said: 'Standing' here implies jumping [which being unusual was therefore subject in the law of Horn].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which could not be exempted from liability even on public ground. ');">¹</span>

בעי ר' זירא מתגלגל מהו היכי דמי כגון דקיימא עמיר ברשות היחיד וקא מתגלגל ואתי מרשות היחיד לרה"ר מאי

R. Zera asked: [In the case of a sheaf that was] rolling about, what would he the law? (In what circumstances? — When, e.g., grain had originally been placed in the plaintiff's premises, but was rolled thence into public ground [by the animal, which consumed the grain while standing on public ground], what would then be the law?)<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' If we were to go by the place of the actual consumption there would be exemption in this case, whereas if the original place whence the food was removed is also taken into account, there would be liability to pay. ');">²</span>

ת"ש דתני רבי חייא משוי מקצתו בפנים ומקצתו בחוץ אכלה בפנים חייבת אכלה בחוץ פטורה מאי לאו מתגלגל ואתי לא אימא אכלה על מה שבפנים חייבת על מה שבחוץ פטורה

— Come and hear that which R. Hiyya taught: 'In the case of a bag of food lying partly inside and partly outside [of the plaintiff's premises], if the animal consumed inside, there would be liability [to pay], but if it consumed outside there would be exemption.' Now, did not this teaching refer to a case where the bag was being continually rolled?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' According to this Baraitha, the place of actual consumption was the basic point to be considered. ');">³</span>

איבעית אימא כי קאמר רבי חייא בפתילה דאספסתא

— No; read '… which the animal consumed, for the part which had originally been lying inside<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Though removed by the animal and consumed outside. ');">⁴</span>

אכלה כסות וכו'

there would be liability but for the part that had always been outside there would be exemption.' You might alternatively say that R. Hiyya referred to a bag containing long stalks of grass.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Which was lying partly inside and partly outside, and as, unlike grain, it constituted one whole, the place of the consumption was material. ');">⁵</span>

אהייא אמר רב אכולהו מאי טעמא כל המשנה ובא אחר ושינה בו פטור

ANIMAL IS MUA'D TO CONSUME BOTH FRUITS AND VEGETABLES. BUT IF IT HAS DESTROYED CLOTHES OR UTENSILS, [ONLY] HALF DAMAGES WILL BE PAID. THIS RULING APPLIES ONLY TO DAMAGE DONE ON THE PLAINTIFF'S PREMISES, BUT IF IT IS DONE ON PUBLIC GROUND THERE WOULD BE EXEMPTION. To what ruling does the last clause refer? — Rab said: [It refers] to all the cases [dealt with in the Mishnah, even to the destruction of clothes and utensils];<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For which there would be no liability on public ground, although, being unusual, it would come under the category of Horn. ');">⁶</span>

ושמואל אמר לא שנו אלא פירות וירקות אבל כסות וכלים חייבת

the reason being that whenever the plaintiff himself acted unlawfully,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' By allowing his clothes or utensils to be on public ground. ');">⁷</span>

וכן אמר ריש לקיש אכולהו ואזדא ריש לקיש לטעמיה דאמר ריש לקיש שתי פרות ברשות הרבים אחת רבוצה ואחת מהלכת בעטה מהלכת ברבוצה פטורה רבוצה במהלכת חייבת

the defendant, though guilty of misconduct, could be under no liability to pay. Samuel on the other hand said: It refers only to the ruling regarding [the consumption of] fruits and vegetables,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Cf. supra p. 17. ');">⁸</span>

ורבי יוחנן אמר לא שנו אלא פירות וירקות אבל כסות וכלים חייבת

whereas in the case of clothes and utensils<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As the damage would come under the category of Horn. ');">⁹</span>

לימא רבי יוחנן לית ליה דריש לקיש אפילו בשתי פרות לא לעולם אית ליה כסות עבדי אינשי דמנחי גלימי ומתפחי אבל בהמה לאו אורחה

there would be liability [even when the damage was done on public ground]. [The same difference of opinion is found between Resh Lakish and R. Johanan, for] Resh Lakish said: [It refers] to all the cases [even to the destruction of clothes and utensils].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 97, n. 5. ');">¹⁰</span>

ואם נהנית משלמת [וכו'] וכמה רבה אמר דמי עמיר רבא אמר דמי שעורים בזול

In this Resh Lakish was following a view expressed by him in another connection, where he stated:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. infra 32a. ');">¹¹</span>

תניא כוותיה דרבה תניא כוותיה דרבא תניא כוותיה דרבה רבי שמעון בן יוחי אמר אין משלמת אלא דמי עמיר בלבד

In the case of two cows on public ground, one lying down and the other walking about, if the one that was walking kicked the one that was lying there would be exemption [since the latter too misconducted itself by laying itself down on public ground], whereas if the one that was lying kicked the one that was walking there would be liability to pay. R. Johanan on the other hand said: The ruling in the Mishnah refers only to the case of fruits and vegetables, whereas in the case of clothes and utensils there would be liability [even when the damage was done on public ground]. Might it thus be inferred that R. Johanan was also against the view expressed by Resh Lakish even in the case of the two cows? — No; [in that case] he could indeed have been in full agreement with him; for while in the case of clothes [and utensils] it might be customary with people to place [their] garments [on public ground] whilst having a rest near by, [in the case of the cows] it is not usual [for an animal to lie down on public ground].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It was therefore a misconduct on the the part of the animal to lie down, which makes it liable for any damage it caused, whilst it is not entitled to payment for any damage sustained. ');">¹²</span>

תניא כוותיה דרבא אם נהנית משלמת מה שנהנית כיצד אכלה קב או קביים אין אומרים תשלם דמיהן אלא אומדין כמה אדם רוצה להאכיל לבהמתו דבר הראוי לה אע"פ שאינו רגיל לפיכך אכלה חטין או דבר הרע לה פטורה

WHERE, HOWEVER, THE ANIMAL HAS DERIVED SOME BENEFIT [FROM THE DAMAGE DONE BY IT]. PAYMENT WILL [IN ANY CASE] BE MADE TO THE EXTENT OF THE BENEFIT. How [could the extent of the benefit be] calculated? — Rabbah said: [It must not exceed] the value of straw [i.e. the coarsest possible food for animals]. But Raba said: The value of barley<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the value of the food actually consumed by the animal. ');">¹³</span>

א"ל רב חסדא לרמי בר חמא לא הוית גבן באורתא בתחומא דאיבעיא לן מילי מעלייתא אמר מאי מילי מעלייתא א"ל הדר בחצר חבירו שלא מדעתו צריך להעלות לו שכר או אין צריך

on the cheapest scale [i.e. two-thirds of the usual price]. There is a Baraitha in agreement with Rabbah, and there is another Baraitha in agreement with Raba. There is a Baraitha in agreement with Rabbah [viz.]: R. Simeon b. Yohai said: The payment [to the extent of the benefit] would not be more than the value of straw.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even when the animal consumed barley, as it might be alleged that straw would have sufficed it. ');">¹⁴</span>

היכי דמי אילימא בחצר דלא קיימא לאגרא וגברא דלא עביד למיגר זה לא נהנה וזה לא חסר אלא בחצר דקיימא לאגרא וגברא דעביד למיגר זה נהנה וזה חסר

There is a Baraitha in agreement with Raba [viz.]: When the animal derived some benefit [from the damage done by it], payment would [in any case] be made to the extent of the benefit. That is to say, in the case of [an animal] having consumed [on public ground] one <i>kab</i><span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' A certain measure: v. Glos. ');">¹⁵</span>

לא צריכא בחצר דלא קיימא לאגרא וגברא דעביד למיגר מאי מצי אמר ליה מאי חסרתיך או דלמא מצי אמר

or two <i>kabs</i> [of barley], no order would be given to pay the full value of the barley [that was consumed], but it would be estimated how much might an owner be willing to spend to let his animal have that particular food [which was consumed] supposing it was good for it, though in practice he was never accustomed to feed it thus. It would therefore follow that in the case of [an animal] having consumed wheat or any other food unwholesome for it, there could be no liability at all. R. Hisda said to Rami b. Hama: You were not yesterday with us in the House of Study<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit. 'in our district,' 'domain' [H]. This word is omitted in some texts, v. D. S. a.l. ');">¹⁶</span> where there were discussed some specially interesting matters. The other thereupon asked him: What were the specially interesting matters? He answered: [The discussion was whether] one who occupied his neighbour's premises unbeknown to him would have to pay rent<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For the past. ');">¹⁷</span> or not. But under what circumstances? It could hardly be supposed that the premises were not for hire,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' And would in any case have remained vacant. ');">¹⁸</span> and he [the one who occupied them] was similarly a man who was not in the habit of hiring any,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' As he had friends who were willing to accommodate him without any pay. ');">¹⁹</span> for [what liability could there be attached to a case where] the defendant derived no benefit and the plaintiff sustained no loss? If on the other hand the premises were for hire and he was a man whose wont it was to hire premises, [why should no liability be attached since] the defendant derived a benefit and the plaintiff sustained a loss? — No; the problem arises in a case where the premises were not for hire, but his wont was to hire premises. What therefore should be the law? Is the occupier entitled to plead [against the other party]: 'What loss have I caused to you [since your premises were in any case not for hire]?'